POLÍTICAS DE INCENTIVOS RELACIONADAS COM A INVESTIGAÇÃO: UMA REVISÃO CRÍTICA DA TEORIA DOS CONTRATOS (publicado em espanhol)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0123-5923(11)70172-3Palavras-chave:
Risco moral, investigação, docência, políticas de incentivosResumo
Tradicionalmente, as universidades colombianas sempre estiveram focadas no ensino. Algumas delas, públicas e privadas, reconfiguraram sua visão e desenvolveram políticas para incorporar a investigação entre suas prioridades. Nessas instituições se oferecem incentivos as publicações, tentando que através da investigação os professores gerem conhecimento e o divulguem em revistas indexadas nacionais e internacionais, livros de investigação, ou na participação em congressos e eventos acadêmicos. Esse artigo pretende realçar o valor da Teoria dos Contratos para entender a política de estímulos a investigação em instituições de educação superior colombianas, realizando uma revisão as principais contribuições teóricas sobre o problema do risco moral e discutindo a política de incentivos para a investigação no âmbito deste quadro teórico.
Downloads
Referências
Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.
Ang, J., Cole, R. y Lin, J.W. (2000). Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Finance, 55(1), 81-106.
Azariadis, C. (1983). Employment with Asymmetric Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(Supplement), 157-172.
Besancenot, D. y Vranceanu, R. (2008). Can incentives for research harm research? A business schools' tale. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 37(3), 1248-1265.
Bhattacharya, S. (1979). Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 259-270.
Bolton, P. y Dewatripont, M. (2004). Contract Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Bonner, S. y Sprinkle, G. (2002). The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task performance: theories, evidence, and a framework for research. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 27(4-5), 303-345.
Borch, K. (1962). Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market. Econometrica, 30(3), 424-444.
Brickley, J. y Zimmerman, J. (2001). Changing incentives in a multitask environment: evidence from a top-tier business school. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(4), 367-396.
Campbell, D. (2006). Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information (2a ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Carmichael, H. (1988). Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure? The Journal of Political Economy, 96(3), 453-472.
Chari, V. (1983). Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 (Supplement), 107-122.
Chiappori, P. y Macho, I. (1989). Contrats de travail répétés: Le rolé de la mémoire. Annales d' Economie et de Statistique, 17(1), 47-70.
Chiappori, P., Macho, I., Rey, P. y Salanié, B. (1994). Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment and the Access to Credit Markets. European Economic Review, 38(8), 1527-1553.
Clark, B. (1997). Las universidades modernas: espacios de investigación y docencia. México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, UNAM.
Fama, E. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307.
Fama, E. y Jensen, M. (1983a). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.
Fama, E. y Jensen, M. (1983b). Agency Problems and Residual Claims. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327-349.
Freixas, X., Guesnerie, R. y Tirole, J. (1985). Planning Under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect. Review of Economic Studies, 52(2), 173-191.
Fudenberg, D., Holmström, B. y Milgrom, P. (1990). Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships. Journal of Economic Theory, 51(1), 1-31.
Green, J. y Kahn, C. (1983). Wage-Employment Contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(Supplement), 173-187.
Grossman, S. y Hart, O. (1983a). An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica, 51(1), 7-45.
Grossman, S. y Hart, O. (1983b). Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(Supplement), 123-156.
Holmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 74-91.
Holmström, B. (1982a). Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 324-340.
Holmström, B. (1982b). Design of Incentive Schemes and the New Soviet Incentive Model. European Economic Review, 17(2), 127-148.
Holmström, B. (1999). Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective. Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 169-182.
Holmström, B. y Milgrom, P. (1987). Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives. Econometrica, 55(2), 303-328.
Holmström, B. y Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7(Special Issue), 24-52.
Jensen, M. y Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Jensen, M. y Murphy, K. (1990). Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives. The Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264.
Kahn, C. y Huberman, G. (1988). Two-Sided Uncertainty and "Upor-Out" Contracts. Journal of Labor Economics, 6(4), 423-444.
Lambert, R. (1983). Long-term contracts and moral hazard. Bell Journal of Economics, 14(2), 441-452.
Leland, H. y Pyle, D. (1977). Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371-387.
Ma, C.A. y Weiss, A. (1993). A signaling theory of unemployment. European Economic Review, 37(1), 135-157.
Macho, I. y Pérez, D. (1994). Introducción a la Economía de la Información. Barcelona: Ariel Economía.
Malcomson, J. y Spinnewyn, F. (1988). The multiperiod principalagent problem. Review of Economic Studies, 55(183), 391-408.
Mangematin, V. (2000). PhD job market: professional trajectories and incentives during the PhD. Research Policy, 29(6), 741-756.
Miller, M. y Rock, K. (1985). Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. The Journal of Finance, 40(4), 1031-1051.
Mirrlees, J. (1971). An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of Economic Studies, 38(114), 175-208.
Mirrlees, J. (1974). Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty. En M. Balch, D. McFadden y S-Y. Wu (Eds.), Essays on Equilibrium Behavior under Uncertainty (pp. 203-272). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Mirrlees, J. (1975). The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I. Published in 1999. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 3-21.
Mirrlees, J. (1976). The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization. The Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1), 105-131.
Murphy, K. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 11-42.
Noldeke, G. y Van Damme, E. (1990). Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market. The Review of Economic Studies, 57(189), 1-23.
Rey, P. y Salanié, B. (1990). Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: On the value of commitment in contracting. Econometrica, 58(3), 597-619.
Rogerson, W. (1985). Repeated moral hazard. Econometrica, 53(1), 69-76.
Ross, S. (1977). Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation: Discussion. The Journal of Finance, 32(2), 412-415.
Shavell, S. (1979a). Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), 55-73.
Shavell, S. (1979b). On moral hazard and insure. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4), 541-562.
Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355-374.
Spence, M. (1974). Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Tien, F. (2007). Faculty research behaviour and career incentives: The case of Taiwan. International Journal of Educational Development, 27(1), 4-17.
von Neumann, J. y Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Weiss, A. (1983). A Sorting-cumLearning Model of Education. The Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 420-442.
Wilson, R. (1968). The Theory of Syndicates. Econometrica, 36(1), 119-132.
Downloads
Publicado
Edição
Seção
Licença
Os autores dos artigos serão responsáveis dos mesmos e, assim, não comprometam os princípios ou políticas da Universidade Icesi nem do Conselho Editorial da revista Estudios Gerenciales. Os autores autorizam e aceitam a transferência de todos os direitos para a revista Estudios Gerenciales para a publicão impressa ou eletrônica. Após a publicação do artigo, pode ser reproduzido sem a permissão do autor ou da revista, se mencionar o(s) autor(es), o ano, o título, o volume e o número e o intervalo de páginas da publicação, e Estudios Gerenciales como fonte (se abster de utilizar Revista Estudios Gerenciales).
Como Citar
