Los determinantes del pago por rendimiento en filiales argentinas de empresas multinacionales

Marcelo Delfini; Ignacio Cretini; Alejandra Quadrana

doi:10.18046/j.estger.2018.149.2872

Autores/as

Marcelo Delfini Investigador, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas - CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Jefe de Trabajos Prácticos, Carrera de Relaciones del Trabajo, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Ignacio Cretini Becario doctoral, Centro de Investigaciones y Transferencia Golfo San Jorge, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas – CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Alejandra Quadrana Becaria doctoral, Instituto de Industria de la Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas – CONICET, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18046/j.estger.2018.149.2872

Palabras clave:

Pagos por rendimiento, Empresas multinacionales, Evaluación de desempeño

Resumen

El objetivo de este artículo es establecer los factores que determinan los pagos por rendimiento en empresas multinacionales de Argentina. El estudio se realiza a través de un modelo de regresión logística y, adicionalmente, se incorpora un análisis de los efectos marginales sobre las variables explicativas a partir de una encuesta realizada a 83 filiales de empresas multinacionales. Los resultados indican que la probabilidad de incorporar pagos por rendimiento aumenta cuando las firmas tienen mayores niveles de ventas externas y son trasnacionalizadas, mientras que disminuye para aquellas empresas con un control local de los recursos humanos y en las que existe una importante presencia sindical; finalmente, no se observa incidencia significativa por parte del país de origen de la empresa.

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